Iran's February 2000 Majlis poll, which resulted in an overwhelming victory for supporters of President Khatami's reform programme, is an indication of the painstaking evolutionary nature of the Islamic Republic which has characterised Iranian politics since the late 1980s.

Under the presidency of Rafsanjani between 1989 and 1997, the phase of creeping pragmatism in foreign, domestic and economic policy began. But with President Khatami's election in 1997 the process quickened and since the recent Majlis poll claims by senior reformist figures that the process of change is 'irreversible', need no longer be regarded as wishful thinking.

Analysts had been predicting for some time that with a relatively free and fair election the reformist coalition, known as the second Khordad Front (named to commemorate the date of Khatami's win in 1997), would win at least two-thirds of the seats. The only stumbling block to a reformist victory was the conservative-controlled Council of Guardians and its ability to affect the result by screening out the reformists' nominated candidates.

It became clear the clerical establishment had embarked on a course of damage limitation

As it turned out, it was mainly high profile reformists who were ousted (such as gaoled liberal cleric Abdullah Nuri and former radical student leader Abbas Abdi), while the bulk of reformist nominees were permitted to run. It became clear the clerical establishment had embarked on a course of damage limitation, to prevent a complete wipe-out of conservative candidates.

The decision by the Council of Guardians to effectively allow the reformists to win, by allowing most of them to stand, was as significant as the result itself. Approximately 750 out of 6,800 nominations were screened out, or just over 11 per cent. In comparison, the Council of Guardians screened out no less than 30-35 per cent of candidates for the Majlis elections of 1992 and 1996. Most of these were leftists and reformers. Obviously, although the clerical establishment still represents a powerful conservative force in the Islamic Republic, it would rather accept reform, albeit at a slower pace, than resist it and risk the collapse of the entire regime.

A decision to reject the reformist nominations wholesale would have indicated that the clerical establishment had opted to keep Khatami isolated and make political, legal and social reforms difficult to implement. It would also have raised concerns about Khatami's ability to be re-nominated for president. Instead, the decision to allow the Iranian electorate their widest choice in candidates since the revolution in 1979 is an implicit recognition that reform within the Islamic Republic is unavoidable. As Iran's political institutions are gradually being strengthened, the nature of the Islamic Republic is becoming less ideological and more pragmatic. In essence, the revolution is evolving.

Supreme leader Khamanei will still be a crucial figure in future developments

Signs of this were clear when on several occasions after the July 1999 student riots supreme leader Khamanei stepped in to back embattled President Khatami when he came under pressure from inveterate hardliners. At that time Khatami was extremely vulnerable and the conservatives had their best chance to humiliate him or even remove him from office. But six months later, the reformers have won control of the Majlis and the police officers responsible for inciting the student unrest are facing trial.

Supreme leader Khamanei will still be a crucial figure in future developments, but to ensure his own political survival and to act as a bridge between the factions he will not throw his weight behind any hardline conservative moves to crush reformist elements within the government.

As The Middle East went to press the exact make-up of the new Majlis was still uncertain, with 65 seats (out of 290) still to be decided by a second-round election, to be held some time in April. However, Iranian sources put the reformist Second Khordad Front in the lead with 148 seats, with 35 for the conservative groups, 37 for various independents and five for religious minorities, from a total of 225 decided seats.

The reformist domination is best reflected in the cities. In Mashhad, Esfahan, Tabriz and Shiraz, reformers won all seats decided and even one out of three in the clerical Shi'ite bastion of Qom. When Rafsanjani was elected President in 1989, he was associated with the clerical right In Teheran the trouncing of the conservatives was complete, with reformers taking 29 out of 30 seats. With a scheduled re-count of one third of the votes due to alleged irregularities, former president Rafsanjani's attempt to return to the Majlis could be foiled as he just scraped in ahead of a solid reformist candidate who was placed 31st.

Assuming that the reformists win the same 65 per cent of seats in the second round, they will have approximately 190 seats out of 290 in the upcoming sixth Majlis. This result was perhaps unthinkable prior to Khatami's election in 1997, but not surprising when shifting trends in the country over the last decade are examined.

When Rafsanjani was elected president in 1989, he was associated with the clerical right but, from the outset, he was more pragmatic in outlook. By this time two clear factions had emerged. The first was known as the Ruhaniyat, which was dominated by clerics and had strong support from the bazaar. This group firmly believed in Khomeini's concept of velayate faqih which entrenches clerical control over organs of the state through the supreme leader and the Council of Guardians.

It was essentially a socialist outlook with an Islamic flavour

The Ruhaniyat had a traditionalist Islamic platform, to be implemented through cultural and social restrictions and limits on freedom of expression. Because of their bazaari links and the fact that many senior clerics own property, they were suspicious of the regime's younger 'Islamic socialist' elements, represented by their main opponents, the Ruhaniyoun. They were also less interested in exporting the Islamic revolution than in solidifying a traditional Iranian Islamic society through clerical rule. In contemporary Iran, the Ruhaniyat represent the largest hardline bloc against the reformists in the Majlis.

The leftist Ruhaniyoun, on the other hand, emerged as bitter opponents of the Ruhaniyat, which explains its support for President Khatami. The Ruhaniyoun viewed the Islamic revolution in terms of economic and social transformation, to be carried out through the nationalisation of industry, land reform, redistribution of wealth and attainment of social justice for the poor. It was essentially a socialist outlook with an Islamic flavour. Its members were also more concerned with exporting the principles of revolutionary Islam to other Islamic countries and in adopting a tough line on foreign policy.

He began to appoint liberal minded technocrats to senior bureaucratic positions

The Ruhaniyoun controlled the Majlis between 1984 and 1992, so inevitably there was friction between President Rafsanjani's free-market oriented policies and the statist philosophy of the Ruhaniyoun-dominated Majlis. Unlike the Ruhaniyat, the Ruhaniyoun of today has come to accept the need for political liberalisation and easing of social restrictions, but on economic issues it remains in favour of state intervention.

Rafsanjani recognised that after Khomeini's death and the end of the war with Iraq, liberal economic reform and a more cooperative foreign policy were needed. In this sense he was more modernist than his Ruhaniyat colleagues. He began to appoint liberal minded technocrats to senior bureaucratic positions (such as Mohsen Noorbaksh as Central Bank governor), arguing that a bureaucrat's education and skills were more important than his revolutionary credentials. It was these technocrats that in 1996 formed the Kargozoran group that also threw its weight behind Khatami in 1997.

The Kargozoran is currently one of the factions in the Second Khordad Front. Its members are uncomfortable with the leftist economics of other groups in the pro-Khatami bloc, as well as with the obscurantist social views of the anti-modernist right, represented by the hardline clerics and the Ruhaniyat.

Facing opposition from the leftists in the Majlis, Rafsanjani's response was to get the Council of Guardians to screen them out of the Majlis nomination process for the elections in 1992. This was done so effectively that the Ruhaniyoun became an almost non-existent force in the Majlis, which between 1992 and 2000 became dominated by the conservative Ruhaniyat. The leftists have never forgiven Rafsanjani for their humiliation in 1992, which is why they refused to support his Majlis candidacy this year, even though he presented himself as a reformer with the support of the centrist Kargozoran.

Apart from maintaining neutrality during the Gulf War and the appointment of skilled technocrats to crucial government bodies, Rafsanjani's reform programme was not a success. Attempts to liberalise the economy and ease social restrictions were half-hearted, and the traditional right, represented by the Ruhaniyat in the Majlis and the Council of Guardians, had no more sympathy for economic reform than the leftist Ruhaniyoun.

During Rafsanjani's presidency Khatami was impeached by the Majlis when he was minister for culture and Islamic guidance for his too liberal views on culture and freedom of expression. Nevertheless, by the early 1990s, the Iranian population had already grown tired of revolutionary fervour and international isolation. The decade-long war with Iraq had also taken its toll. In the presidential poll of 1993, the lack of interest of the Iranian electorate in Rafsanjani's timid reform efforts was obvious. Opposed by two uninspiring unknowns, he polled only 63 per cent of the vote from a low, 56 per cent, turnout. It was clear even then that disgruntled Iranians were turning their backs on a system that had not changed enough to meet their expectations. This left a vacuum Khatami was able to exploit with his emphatic victory in 1997.

Khatami can claim his mandate has been strengthened

The 2000 Majlis poll represented the third successive drubbing of the conservatives after the presidential elections in 1997 and the local elections last year. As distasteful as they were to the clerical establishment, the results were nevertheless honoured. With the reformists now in control of the executive and legislative branches the authority of the hardliners is gradually being eroded, positive confirmation that in today's Iran, elections do matter.

Khatami can claim his mandate has been strengthened because the only two circles of power in the government directly accountable to the people (presidency and parliament) are in the domain of the reformists. With a cooperating Majlis, Khatami and his ministers (who are all reformists except the intelligence minister) will be free from the threat of impeachment and the conservatives no longer have the option of winding back reforms by introducing reactionary legislation. The evolutionary process will be less complicated with a reformist-controlled Majlis in place.

The politics of the Islamic Republic have entered a new phase, which will likely be characterised by greater conflict between the legislative branch and the still-powerful clerical bodies, especially the Council of Guardians.

Already the Council has rejected privatisation proposals included in the recent budget, and imminent attempts to introduce legislation to ease restrictions on the press, political activity and the use of satellite dishes will put the Majlis in direct confrontation with the Council. This will make the role of the Expediency Council - a body established by Khomeini in 1988 to solve disputes between the Majlis and the Council of Guardians - more important

Meanwhile the Second Khordad Front is a broad coalition of groups united by their opposition to the Ruhaniyat and support for political liberalisation. Beyond this, divisions will emerge in other policy areas, especially economic issues. The technocratic Kargozaran are market reform advocates while the Ruhaniyoun and Khatami's own Islamic Iran Participation Front (IIPF) emphasise social justice over market efficiency.

the senior clerical bodies they do not have the absolute authority to impose arbitrary rule Many of the successful reformist candidates were on the ticket of the IIPF, a faction formed to provide impetus in the Majlis for the president's political, legal and social reform priorities. This group will be the most influential in the Second Khordad Front. On the other hand, in deference to their mentor Rafsanjani, the Kargozoran could be more accommodating towards the clerical establishment.

An immediate contest will take place for the speaker's position if Rafsanjani holds on to his Teheran seat after the recount. Other reform groups will not support him on the grounds he was included on the conservative ticket as well as the Kargozoran's.

These tensions merely indicate that in contemporary Iranian politics there exists a series of drastically conflicting ideas, albeit within an Islamic framework.

Despite the formidable barriers to reform, represented by the senior clerical bodies they do not have the absolute authority to impose arbitrary rule and their legitimacy is now severely restricted.

Meanwhile, as the executive and legislative organs of government strengthen their role and the factions increasingly resemble organised political parties, it is becoming clearer that the legacy of the events of 1979 has become less one of revolution and more of evolution.