In the five years since Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani came to power Qatar has emerged from relative obscurity to play an important role in the Gulf region. The new Emir promised a relaxation of press censorship and greater transparency of government procedures and kept his word on both counts. However, while such moves towards democracy have pleased Qataris, near neighbours have shown signs of consternation, writes Tom Owen

When Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, the current Emir of Qatar, succeeded his father in a bloodless coup in 1995, he promised rapid reform and progress for the tiny state, which had become extraordinarily sleepy under his father’s rule. Subsequently, the Emir has more than fulfilled his promise, and in foreign policy in particular he has done much to raise Qatar’s profile and prestige in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and beyond.

Foreign policy since the coup has, not surprisingly, reflected the need of a small, rich state to ensure its security by balancing other powers in the region. In short this can be summed up as a broadly pro-US, moderate Arab position, also seeking to find common ground with other small neighbours.

Locally, Qatar is moving closer to the UAE and Oman, as a southern Gulf bloc begins to emerge

In November 1999 Qatar allowed four Hamas leaders into the country after they had been expelled from Jordan, causing some observers to speculate that the government was sympathetic to the group. It is more likely that the reverse is true, and that Qatar agreed to harbour the Hamas men as a favour to King Abdullah, allowing him to clean his hands in preparation for Arab-Israeli final status talks. Indeed, Israel maintains a ‘trade office’ in Doha, an embassy in all but name, although ironically Israeli imports to Qatar totalled a measly $26,000 in 1999. The hosting of the world handball championships in Doha in 1999, including an Israeli team, provoked the wrath of other Arab countries, some of whom boycotted the event.

Yet Qatar has simply chosen to do publicly what all of its Gulf neighbours have been doing more discreetly for some years: preparing for peace with Israel.

Relations with the US — essentially the only credible guarantor of the country’s security — are very close. A US air base with a massive stock of pre-positioned arms and ammunition is under construction in the desert, to act as a base for possible future conflicts in the region. And SOCCENT, the US out of area operations headquarters, is rumoured to be considering moving from Florida to Qatar. Yet ministers are quite prepared to call US policy into question, and Sheikh Hamad bin Jassem bin Jaber Al Thani, the minister of foreign affairs (see box) has in the last 18 months publicly suggested a softer line on Iraq.

Locally, Qatar is moving closer to the UAE and Oman, as a southern Gulf bloc begins to emerge. The most obvious sign of this is the Dolphin project, a plan to build a natural gas pipeline from Qatar’s massive North Field gas bubble to Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Oman and eventually Pakistan. The project, costed at $8 to $10 billion, is under the leadership of the UAE Offsets Group, essentially a branch of the UAE ministry of defence, and will greatly enhance the countries’ economic interdependence.

The one country missing from this group is, of course, Bahrain. The disputed Hawar island and associated outcrops, currently held by Qatar, have soured relations between the countries for decades. The matter is now with the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which heard summing up from both sides in late June. According to Richard Schofield, lecturer in boundary studies at the School of Oriental & African Studies (SOAS) in London, “most people expect it to go Bahrain’s way, and for Qatar to accept the decision of the ICJ as binding. Either way, a ruling is expected by November, or by February 2001 at the latest.” Whether a decisive outcome would allow both parties to put the matter behind them and to develop a closer relationship is at this stage, difficult to predict.

Aside from diplomacy, it is the Qatari regional satellite news channel Al Jazira that has done most to raise the country’s profile. Its remarkably unrestricted style of political coverage has reinvigorated political debate accross the Arab world, and ruffled many feathers. Saudi Arabia has made veiled threats to Qatar in an attempt to gag Al Jazira, and criticism of Tunisia’s human rights record drew this colourful abuse from Tunisian (state-dominated) newspapers in May 2000:

“Qatar was a quiet and dreaming state until a storm of megalomania hit the son, who then violated the sanctity of his father and usurped his throne, starting an exciting journey of madness...he uses Al Jazira to focus the spotlight on himself...the poisons of the station have targeted Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Algeria, Libya and it is a long list.”

Strong stuff. Yet it should come as no surprise that in leading the Gulf in liberalising media, and therefore political life (rather than merely pontificating on the subject as other Arab states usually do), Qatar should draw some fire.

Women’s issues have also assumed greater prominence; in May 1998 the Emir’s wife gave an interview in which she advocated reform to facilitate the participation of women in the country’s political life. With its imminent gas wealth from two new liquefied gas projects, and it strides in developing civic society at home, Qatar deserves close attention as a litmus paper for change in the Gulf and the wider Arab world.

Qatar’s minister of foreign affairs, Sheikh Hamad bin Jassem bin Jaber Al Thani, 41, is an intriguing figure who plays a central role in the country that goes far beyond foreign policy. His influence derives from his uniqely close and trusting relationship with the Emir: he was reputedly the main power broker mustering support for the Emir in the 1995 coup that brought him to power, and again played a crucial role in suppressing the subsequent attempted coup against the new Emir. Trials against those involved in that episode are still ongoing.

In the unaccountable and sometimes murky world of Gulf monarchies, whose histories so often resemble a Shakespearean history play in Arab garb, trust is the one most precious commodity in the halls of power. Of course, that very murkiness makes definitive statements about who truly wields power rather hard to make, but Qatar watchers (a small and hardy corps) agree that Hamad bin Jassem’s influence on almost all aspects of the country’s policy cannot be overstated.

In the aftermath of the coup it was Hamad bin Jassem’s, opinions which helped the Emir inject a much-needed dose of energy into Qatar. In his previous, rather low-profile roles as Director of the Office of Minister of Municipal Affairs, Minister of Agriculture and Municipal Affairs, and Acting Minister of Electricity and Water, he had shown a distinct tendency to get things done and as foreign minister he has continued to do so. The impressively timely progress of large scale projects as Rasgas and Qatargas (liquefied natural gas plants), is attributed by the energy and construction company executives involved, to his insistence on progress and action.

He demonstrates equal enthusiasm in his own, extensive business interests, which he skilfully combines with his public duties. The exact extent of his domestic interests is a matter of conjecture, and less still is known about his foreign interests.

Seen by local journalists as being in the forefront of Qatar’s drive to become the most open of the Gulf states

In terms of Hamad bin Jassem’s wider influence on Qatar, two aspects of his business activities are particularly interesting. First, he has without doubt acquired the widest media holdings in Qatar and is seen by local journalists as being in the forefront of Qatar’s drive to become the most open of the Gulf states. Second, in June 2000 he bought 60 per cent (mainly via family proxies) of the Doha branch of Grindlay’s bank, with 40 per cent remaining in the hands of Standard Chartered, the British colonial bank.

The bank now has a wider local licence, and is renamed Qatar Grindlays. His purchase of a controlling interest in the bank provided a rare glimpse of the extent of his power. In early 2000 the transaction came under the scrutiny of the Emir’s advisory council, as laid down in central bank regulations. The council found that several technicalities were not in order, and several representatives were reported to be uncomfortable with yet another significant expansion of the minister’s personal empire. The council therefore referred the matter to the Emir’s cabinet for further consideration and ruling. At this point the Emir announced that the sale would go ahead and that the council need not concern itself further with the matter. There were few doubts about who had whispered in the ruler’s ear. The matter caused some irritation in Qatar, not least because it made explicit the weakling status of the advisory council. He also incurred wrath from several quarters in 1999 when he proposed a Qatar-based investment vehicle that would offer private individuals, among other things, a stake in the upstream oil and gas industry. This was sacrilege: one banker in Qatar described it as “tantamount to the gods offering a stake in ambrosia production”. It would certainly have been a first in the more earthly Gulf region, but it now appears the oil and gas component has been quietly dropped.

Hamad bin Jassem has also had extensive dealings in defence supplies, both as an official buyer for the state, and as a seller to third parties. In July Britain’s Sunday Times revealed that Qatar intended to give $7.5 million in British armaments, including military land Rovers and night vision kit, as a present to the Algerian government. The deal provoked cross-party criticism in the British parliament and condemnation from organisations such as Amnesty International. The gift was subsequently confirmed by Hamad bin Jassem, who is believed by sources in Qatar to have influenced the arrangement.

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