Saddam and the west’s worst nightmare
There are indications Saddam Hussein is again engaged in building atom
bombs. Richard Butler, former head of UNSCOM — the UN Special Commission
that dealt with uncovering Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction — disclosed
in New York recently that the Iraqi dictator had reassembled his nuclear
weapons team. Al J Venter reports from Washington
If the reports are accurate it is the West’s worst nightmare come true,
especially since Dr Khidhir Hamza, the most senior Iraqi nuclear physicist
to have defected to the West, said in Washington DC in November that with
the acquisition of nuclear fuel, Saddam might be only months away from
completing the Arab world’s first atomic bomb.
Western intelligence sources have been aware for some time that Saddam
holds components for at least three complete atom bombs in the 20-kiloton
range (roughly what was dropped on Japanese cities by the Americans in
World War II). Until now, all the Iraqi leader lacked was sufficient weapons
grade uranium or plutonium with which to arm them. And, since there are
scores of documented instances of thwarted attempts to smuggle fissile
material out of the former Soviet Union (FSU), it is not difficult to
imagine that some of the shipments actually got through. There is much
relating to the production of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq
that point to such a scenario.
Saddam’s attempt
to build a nuclear weapon has been well documented
Since Dr Hamza’s defection to America, he has made some astonishing disclosures.
Shortly after arriving he was extensively debriefed by David Albright
and Kevin O’Neill of Washington’s Institute for Science and International
Security (ISIS). The Middle East was given access to almost 100 pages
of questions and answers. The nature and extent of Iraq’s nuclear weapons
programme was among the issues raised. Aspects discussed included:
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Indigenous production as well as overt and covert procurement of natural
uranium compounds for use in an atom bomb
-
lIndustrial-scale facilities for the production of pure uranium compounds
for fuel enrichment or isotope enrichment
-
Research and development (R&D) of the full range of enrichment technologies
culminating in the industrial-scale exploitation of electromagnetic isotope
separation (EMIS) and substantial progress towards similar exploitation
of gas centrifuge enrichment technology
-
Design and feasibility studies for an indigenous plutonium production
reactor
-
R&D of irradiated fuel reprocessing technology
-
R&D of weaponisation capabilities for implosion-based nuclear weapons
at the Al Atheer nuclear weapons development and production plant near
Baghdad
-
A ‘crash programme’ (after the Gulf War) aimed at diverting safeguarded
research reactor fuel and recovering weapons-grade uranium for use in
an atom bomb.
Saddam’s attempt to build a nuclear weapon has been well documented. Twice,
according to The Washington Post, UN arms inspectors in — 1996 and 1997
— reported they had credible intelligence indicating Iraq had built and
maintained all the working components for three ‘implosion devices’. All
Iraq lacked were cores of enriched uranium to make 20-kiloton atom bombs.
This is roughly the same yield as the two bombs dropped on the Japanese
cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Dr Khidhir Hamza
disclosed the first and most comprehensive help received was “a gift from
the US Atomic Energy Project”
Almost all the technical information required for nuclear weapons production,
ISIS discovered, was acquired by Iraqi students, particularly those in
the US, who combed university libraries for bomb making information. Iraqi
agents and scientists, collecting valuable data at American scientific
conferences, supplemented this activity. There was a lot of similar activity
with regard to the acquisition of technical know-how for the building
of chemical and biological weapons.
Iraq also purchased professional packages from companies that designed
equipment for CERN (the European nuclear authority).
Although the Iraqi physicist provides no concrete case details where he
was involved in obtaining classified US documents, he does point out that
rubbing shoulders with those who have access to sensitive information
has the potential to reap important rewards.
Interestingly, during his debriefing, Dr Hamza disclosed that the first
and most comprehensive help received in his bid to build a nuclear weapon
was “a gift from the US Atomic Energy Project — library copies of reports
on the 1940s Manhattan Project”. As one of only three or four nuclear
physicists in Iraq in the 1970s, he reported finding the reports at Iraq’s
atomic energy library “in a corner with piles of dust on them... sitting
there telling me exactly what I had to do.”
The Manhattan project was the crash US government programme in which scientists
developed the atomic bombs that were dropped on Japan, forcing the end
of World War II.
Much of the equipment needed for Iraq’s atomic bomb programme was classified
as dual use: material that might also have a civil application — for example,
advanced explosives for mining purposes. It seems the innocuous uses the
Iraqis proposed were rarely if ever questioned by exporters. That situation
prevailed for some years, until the West realised that it was being duped.
In his debriefing, Dr Hamza noted that certain government sectors — including
agriculture, oil and others were, as he put it, “used as needed to smuggle
equipment and obtain information not available elsewhere.
“The [Iraqi atomic energy] chairman would send me a list and ask what
I needed. I would tell him that I would perhaps like more on EMIS technology
or that I needed something advanced on diffusion. He would split the list
up and send it off to various ministries so that it wouldn’t be directly
traceable to the atomic energy department. Then he would split the companies
to avoid ordering more than two or three items from the same firm, which
was an ideal system that we used for cover.”
One particular Iraqi government organisation — the El Hazen Institute
— played a major role in acquiring information. El Hazen, Dr Hamza said,
“started all WMD programmes and had excellent contacts with the University
of Arizona. Iraqi students were sent to Arizona to study laser technology,
which was a major factor in Saddam’s weapons programmes.
When the inspectors
arrived we would just lock the doors to the areas where we were working
to enrich uranium for the bomb
At a press conference, Joseph Cirincione of the Carnegie Endowment questioned
Dr Hamza as to how all this activity was kept secret from the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
“Of course, Israel made a lot of fuss about it,” Dr Hamza replied. “When
we went into the initial stages, the French reactor at Osiraq (subsequently
destroyed by the Israeli Air Force) was not working, so there were no
problems. Later we went into the enrichment programme and that was in
clear violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. When the inspectors
arrived, we would just lock the doors to the areas where we were working.
We would take them on a route that bypassed the locked doors behind which
we were working to enrich uranium for the bomb.”
After the Israeli bomb attack, the Iraqi nuclear physicist said the nuclear
weapons team was increased from about 500 to 7,000 strong over five years
(western intelligence sources indicate it is currently up to about 12,000).
Asked how long he thought it would take Iraq to produce a “workable nuclear
device”, Dr Hamza was hard to pin down: “We had a nuclear programme that
you could look at as having two parts to it. The fissile part (material
that is especially amenable to fission and readily usable for the core
of the atom bomb) had been a problem. It took us 10 years to solve it.
Don’t forget that with a bomb, there are a number of basic components.
The trigger system, which was working, was not the greatest but it was
good enough. Also, the explosives (to detonate the bomb) were not as good
as we would have liked.”
Asked whether, in the case of Saddam using a bomb on Israel, for example,
it would be air-dropped, Dr Hamza replied: “Yes, I think that is why work
is still being done now. When you have a nuclear weapon you need to harden
it to take the stresses of the journey, staying together and working.
This hardening we did not have in 1990. We barely managed to make a mock-up
of an actual bomb without a core. Working on the actual hardening started
after the [Gulf] war and I think that now they haveÉ a bomb that could
stay together.”
Saddam can start a fissile material programme in Iraq or get it smuggled
from abroad
Questioned on the consequences of sanctions against Iraq and how an inflow
of scientists to Iraq might affect the timescale for reconstitution of
a viable Iraqi nuclear threat, Dr Hamza noted:
“Right now, I don’t know if the uranium is there, but the design is there.
The construction is difficult and would probably take a few months. It
all depends on how they get the fissile material. Saddam can either start
a fissile material programme in Iraq — the enrichment programme — in which
case it may take him two or three years to have it. Or he can get it smuggled
from abroad, for example from Russia. Then he will have it immediately.”
Another issue raised was how Saddam would actually deploy an atom bomb
if he were to acquire nuclear capability. Queries were raised as to whether
the atom bomb project would be a secret weapon, to be used in an emergency
or would there be a declaratory policy. How did Dr Hamza envision Saddam
would actually deploy nuclear capability?
Dr Hamza said he did not believe Saddam would keep any significant new
nuclear strength a secret. He went on: “If he has one [atom bomb] he will
keep it a secret. If he has more than one, there is no advantage for him
in keeping it a secret any longer. I think he will test one because that
is what the project was for. Then he will declare himself a nuclear power
and he will use it to his maximum advantage.”
Notably, Hamza added a rider that Saddam would definitely need a test,
to assure himself he actually possesses the atom bomb.
Another issue under discussion was whether Iraq’s bomb(s) would fit into
Scud missiles.
“Originally no,” said Dr Hamza. “The explosives were too large and they
were something like four feet wide, weighing a ton-and-a-half. That was
just too big.” Since then, he intimated, the bomb had been considerably
reduced in size.
Following numerous debriefing sessions, David Albright made the point
that Dr Hamza’s story was not the last word on Iraq’s efforts to acquire
nuclear weapons-related information from the US, or other western countries.
According to a technical specialist who subsequently reviewed many of
his transcripts, he did not disclose many other avenues of acquiring information
that was not officially available to Iraq in the 1980s (or Iran in the
1990s).
Companies involved indicated they knew the equipment was not for peaceful
purposes
Hamza himself concludes that once information has been de-classified or
is otherwise in the public domain, it can spread rapidly. Advances in
information technology and communication systems now enable an individual
to access data electronically from any place in the world. It was his
view that a more effective approach would be “to understand the bottle-necks”
of the would-be proliferator and act accordingly. That way, he suggested,
suppliers could alert the relevant authorities that such information or
equipment was being sought.
Specifically, by way of example, in late 1987 Hamza and his team discussed
with several German companies the procurement of a $200 million foundry
that would be able to melt, purify, cast and machine refractory metals.
Iraq specifically mentioned tungsten, but the real intention was that
the foundry would process uranium into nuclear weapons components.
He went on: “During the negotiations we realised the firms involved were
actually willing to sell all these technologies to us. We were warned
they were complicated, and astonishment was expressed we were entering
such a field. We were also warned costs would be high. It seemed the companies
were prepared to disregard the requirements for export licences by making
special arrangements and packing equipment under covers which made the
export seem natural.”
At that point, Dr Hamza disclosed that the companies involved “even indicated
they knew the equipment was not for peaceful purposes”. It could only
have been intended for the most sophisticated type of weapons manufacture,
he reckoned.
In the end, Iraq did not accept the foundry offered. Saddam’s scientists
feared that the ‘turn-key’ job would have allowed the Germans to learn
the location of the Al Atheer facility and possibly discover that it was
involved in nuclear weapons production.
What this episode did provide was the guideline needed for Saddam to subsequently
procure, piecemeal, all the foundry equipment needed for its nuclear weapons
plant, which were eventually bought from several countries. It also used
the design of the foundry offered by the Germans to design its uranium
processing plant at Al Atheer. .”
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