?Strategic deterrence’ is the buzzword in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states these days and this coincides with a fresh impetus to develop a cohesive defence structure among the six members of that alliance. In part, this stems from dangerous new currents swirling throughout the region and from a growing awareness that the national interests of western powers, the United States in particular, on which the GCC states are currently dependent, may not always coincide with the requirements of the GCC.

This concept of increasing military self-reliance, enunciated by Gulf Arab speakers at a conference on Gulf security held alongside the International Defence Exhibition (IDEX-2001) in Abu Dhabi in March, was given weight by reports from Washington that major changes in US global military strategy may be coming, with the primary focus of military deployments shifting to the Pacific Ocean to counter China’s growing power and the dangers of conflict in Asia.

US ground forces in the Gulf might be reduced with combat strength focused primarily on seaborne assets

US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld presented the outlines of the most radical review of US military priorities in a generation to President George W Bush on 21 March, the day after the Gulf conference ended. The reports of its recommendations did not specifically mention the Middle East, but indicated, in effect, that Washington should abandon the post-Cold War doctrine of being prepared to fight two major wars — the Gulf and Korea have been the most likely arenas — simultaneously, and focus on long-range power projection.

This could well benefit the GCC states since it would entail an immense boost in the USA’s ability to airlift large numbers of combat troops and weapons to the region in the event of any new Gulf crisis. The reports also cite recommendations to phase out the US Navy’s eight $5 billion Nimitz-class aircraft carriers currently deployed — five of them with the Fifth Fleet in the Gulf region and the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean — and replace them with smaller, more manoeuvrable vessels less vulnerable to missile attack.

Indeed, the Rumsfeld report says, the growing threat from weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against US targets could mean allies may no longer want US forces based in or around their territory.

The vulnerability of fixed bases to missiles armed with chemical, biological or nuclear warheads has for some time concerned the US military and led to speculation that US ground forces in the Gulf —including 7,000 in Saudi Arabia and 5,000 in Kuwait — might be reduced at some point, with combat strength focused primarily on seaborne assets.

US officials have repeatedly denied any plans of this nature, but Saudi Arabia and others in the Gulf are only too aware that the presence of US forces on their soil is anathema to their Islamic fundamentalist factions. Also, the cost of maintaining these forces is considerable. It is costly for the Americans too; the bombings in Saudi Arabia in 1995 and 1996, and the suicide bombing of the USS Cole in Aden harbour in October 2000, were reminders of just how vulnerable US forces in the Gulf are.

The Palestinian issue is central to Middle East politics

Strains are emerging between the GCC states and the USA over the Palestinian Intifada and Washington’s Middle East policy, with the Americans insisting there is no link between the Gulf and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Gulf Arab leaders are increasingly saying the two cannot be separated and that they, like other Arab elites, can no longer afford to shrug off the growing anti-Americanism coursing through Arab streets, the populations of which now have unprecedented, although far from unrestricted, access to satellite television and the Internet.

The election of Ariel Sharon as Israel’s prime minister has heightened fears in the Gulf that events could spiral out of control and engulf the region in conflict once more. The Palestinian issue is central to Middle East politics, and recently the Gulf and the Arab-Israeli conflict, as one commentator put it, have ?never been so malignantly intertwined?.

The Arabs were incensed on 27 March when the Bush administration vetoed a UN Security Council resolution to send unarmed UN observers to the Palestinian territories, which the Palestinians had requested to help protect civilians from what UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has branded ?excessive use of force? by Israeli troops. The veto, at the urging of Sharon, who opposes any internationalisation of the conflict, dashed Arab hopes that Bush would be more sympathetic to Arab causes. Some analysts had considered these were based on a simplistic appreciation of US politics. The American decision has dismayed moderate Arab leaderships and will make it much more difficult for Bush to rally Arab support for tightening the noose on Saddam Hussein.

The UN’s sanctions on Iraq are eroding and may even be eased or lifted in the foreseeable future

All this resonates deeply within the ruling councils of the GCC with regard to security and their reliance on the US and the western powers. The moves by Iran to acquire a new conventional arsenal from Russia, in particular the S-300 air-defence system that would negate to a considerable degree the GCC states’ multibillion-dollar investment in air power, is also causing concern even at a time when rapprochement with Teheran is developing.

The UN’s sanctions on Iraq are eroding and may even be eased or lifted in the foreseeable future, spawning new uncertainties and risks about what Saddam will do then. His effort to portray himself as the champion of the Palestinians is enhancing his popularity with the Arab masses. Continued joint US/UK bombing of Iraq, and the new US administration’s declarations of support for Iraq’s opposition forces committed to bringing down Saddam’s regime, together with the dangers of territorial fragmentation and the political vacuum that implies, only heightens concern in the GCC and could induce a more visible rift with Washington.

The Bush administration’s hands-off approach to the Arab-Israeli peace process is certain to radicalise the Arab street, which is the last thing the GCC leaderships want. And this will, in turn, increase the strains that are emerging on their strategic alliance with the US. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Egypt and Jordan are now openly critical of Israel and the stance taken by the US.

The Intifada has galvanised young Arabs across the region, where an estimated 70 per cent of the population is aged under 30, and where unemployment is increasing. In this highly charged climate, the moderate leaderships are slowly being pushed towards more radical policies towards Israel, which is falling back on its old guard for leadership, and, with its military capabilities growing ever more powerful with the help of US aid, is now being seen as a potential threat, along with Iraq and Iran.

For a paradigm of peace in the Gulf there should be a paradigm of peace in Palestine

The senior Arab figures who addressed the security conference in Abu Dhabi all urged greater efforts to forge a fully integrated GCC defence structure that would present a credible deterrent to any potential aggressor and it was clear that Iraq, Iran and Israel were all lumped together in this category.

?Traditionally, security analysts divorced the Gulf security regime from those of the wider Middle East, particularly the Arab-Israeli conflict,? said Saleh Al Mani, professor of politics at King Saud University in Saudi Arabia. ?With the Al Aqsa Intifada, it is very hard to separate the two. People are shaken to their roots when they see Israeli soldiers firing on unarmed Palestinian protesters. They can no longer accept the continued occupation of Jerusalem and Al Haram Al Sharif by Israel, nor can they accept western complicity at the UN Security Council in treating Israel and its occupation as being above international law and the norms of war. The collapse of the peace process through Sharon’s election bodes ill for the whole Middle East, including the Gulf region... For a paradigm of peace in the Gulf there should be a paradigm of peace in Palestine. The two cannot be separated.

?The existence of foreign, particularly American, troops in the Gulf, while required by the logic of deterrence, seems to vibrate within these societies, particularly when people see on television that most Israeli settlers in Jerusalem and in the West Bank and Gaza, speak with a New York accent. Yet the the US government under President Clinton supported Ehud Barak’s peace proposals that merely gave the Palestinians 95 per cent of 22 per cent of historical Palestine and restructured administrative authority over Al Haram Al Sharif, which the Palestinians had administered since the occupation of 1967. Other Clinton proposals negated the Palestinian refugees’ right of return while enshrining the right of return to world Jewry, which seems incomprehensible, not only to those refugees but to the whole Arab world, including people in the Gulf.?

The extension of the US presence in the region did not bring about the requisite peace

The professor concluded: ?Many people have advanced the concept of Pax Americana to be the Utopian solution to the region’s vexing security concerns. This might be helpful in the short run. But the extension of the US presence in the region did not bring about the requisite peace, since the American forces themselves are engaged in counter-stability military activity, particularly in the simmering low-intensity warfare in the skies over Iraq... The number one issue is resolving the 50-year-old Palestinian problem on equitable terms and according to international law and norms. In this regard, the US could send a strong signal to all concerned that all states should abide by the will of the international community and norms of civil behaviour.?

Ahmad Mohammed Al Sabab of the UAE Navy stressed the need for less reliance on major western powers for protection, whose agendas could change. ?The GCC states have grown convinced beyond any doubt that defending their interests and their objectives... depends entirely on their ability to build up their resources and acquire the basis of self-reliance while maintaining a high degree of co-ordination, especially in the military,? he said.

It is difficult to take for granted the sustainability of these interests in the future

?This contrasts sharply with the temporary subordination to the existing reliance, in one form or another, on the protection of big powers which are currently motivated to deter threats to the region out of concern for their own national political, economic and commercial interests and objectives. It is difficult to take for granted the sustainability of these interests in the future.?

The joint defence agreement signed by GCC heads of state at their December summit in Bahrain, after years of delay because of differences between the members, was seen in some quarters as recognition by these states that it was long past time for them to grasp the nettle of integration. And yet the only state to have ratified the accord so far is Bahrain.

The next major hurdle is formulating a joint defence strategy

Still, there are other signs that pragmatism is emerging. On 21 March, Saudi Arabia and Qatar signed an agreement that ended a 35-year border dispute. A few days earlier, Qatar settled a 60-year-old dispute with Bahrain, which almost led to war in 1986, after the International Court of Justice in The Hague split a disputed area potential rich in oil and gas between them. In March 2000, the UAE and Oman fixed their common border after years of acrimony. Saudi Arabia settled a sea border dispute with Kuwait last year and also reached agreement with non-GCC Yemen to define their 1,350 kilometre border after years of military skirmishes.

The failure of the GCC, formed in 1981 in response to the Iran-Iraq war, to develop a functioning common defence strategy was made painfully evident when Saddam invaded Kuwait in 1990.

It has taken a decade since Kuwait’s liberation — by a US-led coalition in which the Arabs themselves did little actual fighting — to bring about any meaningful change. And given the often-divergent defence policies of the individual states it is likely to take as long again before any real military integration will be discernible. The next major hurdle is formulating a joint defence strategy with co-ordinated procurement to promote standardisation in command structure equipment, training, operational policy and, given chronic manpower shortages, the introduction at some point of obligatory military service.

A start has been made with the completion of the initial phase of the Hizam Al Taawun, the ?Belt of Cooperation’, a $160 million joint early warning and air-defence system started in 1997, and with long-delayed plans to build up the Saudi-led 5,000-man Peninsula Shield rapid deployment force based in Hafr Al Baten in north eastern Saudi Arabia to a more credible 25,000-strong mechanised force with its own armour and heavy weapons. Work has begun on a $300 million military base for the force. But there is still a long way to go — and much uncertainty.

Al Sabab stressed that a key priority for the GCC states was establishing ?a joint security system? to achieve the following a objectives:

• Reduce security links with friendly countries to gradually transfer defence responsibilities to local authorities.
  


• Build up defensive preparedness to counter any threat with the necessary swiftness and decisive power.
  


• Limit the dangers of reliance on friends whose response might not be always assured, or whose intervention might come too late to help in a conflict.
  


• Secure a regional balance of power that would guarantee an acceptable level of deterrence in the region.
  
  

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