Taliban forces increase their areas of control in Afghanistan but whether they can gain the last critical 10 per cent is debateable. By Roddy Scott.

Three and a half years after its inception, Afghanistan's extremist Taliban militia has come within an inch of its stated goal: unifying the country by force of arms. Last year saw the collapse of the Northern Alliance opposition to the Taliban. Internal differences in the Jombesh movement saw the two main Uzbak leaders, Abdul Malik and Rashid Dostum, both flee the country with their divided and outgunned forces unable to keep the Taliban from overunning the north of the country, taking the Uzbek heartland. With the Uzbeks out of the picture it has been Tadjik commander, Ahmed Shah Massoud who has subsequently blocked the Taliban from achieving total victory in Afghanistan.

Pre-winter offensives, with both sides trying to gain the last-minute advantage before the onset of the snows, bore witness to rapid military gains for Massoud. Breaking out of his native Panjshir valley he made quick gains in the north east of the country, retaking the strategically important town of Taloqan on the border with Tadjikistan. In early November, though, the Taliban launched a last minute counter-offensive in a bid to retake Taloqan. The Taliban counter offensive broke what had been a two-week truce between the two sides, ostensibly for the purpose of prisoner swaps.

Little progress, though, had been made on the latter issue. A key demand on the government side had been the release, by the Taliban, of Ismail Khan, the former governor of Herat, in the west of the country. A Shia, he is regarded not only as an able military commander but capable of bringing a degree of cohesion between anti-Taliban Shia forces in the west of the country and Sunnis in the east. And it is for exactly the same reason that the Taliban remain reluctant to release him. For all the wrangling over prisoners, though, the ceasefire was - to a large extent - tactical on both sides. With Iranian military manoeuvres on the western border and the need to consolidate control in newly acquired towns such as Mazar-i-Sharif, the Taliban were in no position to marshall anything near their full force in the east. To boot, recent military losses suggested that a ceasefire would be tactically sensible. For Massoud's hard-pressed forces the ceasefire proved to equally advantageous. Short on supplies, government forces were able to bring substantial weaponry across from Tadjikistan, establishing a sorely needed supply route.

The re-establishment of a supply route proved vital in halting the Taliban attack, which came within three kilometres of Taloqan before being repulsed with heavy casualties and further territorial losses. The further subsequent capture of the strategically important Shir-Khan Bandar. On the border with Tadjikistan - for the first time since 1996 - had two important implications: aside from opening up an overland supply route it left the Taliban in Kunduz surrounded on three fronts. Kunduz, long the most strategically important town to be held by the Taliban in the north of the country, has been instrumental in the Taliban supply chain from Kabul. But with Massoud's forces now pushing from three different fronts the chance of the Taliban losing the town has, for the first time in over a year, become a distinct possibility.

For all this, though, the gravity of Massoud's military situation should not be downplayed. The Taliban still control almost 90 per cent of the country and by all accounts continue to receive massive military and financial aid from Pakistan. A dozen or so Pakistani prisoners, recently captured in the north of the country, and wheeled out for visiting journalists, is ample proof of Pakistan's ongoing efforts to ensure Taliban dominance in the country. "There is absolutely no doubt" says Dr. Abdullah, the deputy Afghan foreign minister, "that Pakistan is playing a decisive role in this war. Recruits and weapons are pouring in to the Taliban from Pakistan. Pakistan might think that it is in its national self interest to support the Taliban, but this really is not the case," he said in an interview with The Middle East. "By supporting the Taliban Islammabad is simply strengthening extremism everywhere, encouraging terrorism and the international drugs tradeÉthese are all international problems which can only get bigger if the Taliban eventually win this war."

Whether the Taliban can subjugate the last bastion of resistance remains to be seen. Winter will give both sides a chance for resupply and reorganisation. With the Iranian crisis out of the way the Taliban will, with the arrival of spring, be able to marshall - for the first time - all their forces against Massoud.

Whilst the outlook looks bleak for the hard-pressed forces of the former government, a number of factors have left government officials cautiously optimistic.

Taliban rule in the north, they say, is increasingly unpopular. Northern and liberal cities such as Mazar-i-Sharif have little in common - culturally or politically - with the southern Pashtu speaking Taliban. Moreover, the apparent determination of the Taliban to impose Pashtun village mores on such regions has left government officials increasingly confident that holding the areas will prove more and more difficult for the Taliban. "When the Taliban first took many of the northern regions," said one government official, "we were very worried that they would try to seek some kind of consenus amongst the local population as to who would run the various local administrations... It was with some relief that we noticed they simply sent more troops to places such as Mazar."

A resurgence of fighting in Faryab province, far to the west of the country, (an area that has theoretically been overrun by the Taliban), would also seem to indicate that the Taliban are finding it an increasingly difficult task to control the parts of the country they rule. With Massoud's forces heavily concentrated and increasingly well supplied - in contrast to an increasingly long supply route for the Taliban, with routes from Khandahar in the south to Herat in the west before heading east to Kunduz - the prospects seem a shade brighter.

Internationally as well there has been a steady rise in anti-Taliban sentiment. Saudi Arabia, one of four countries to recognise the Taliban's 'Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan', sent the Taliban ambassador packing in protest over the presence of Saudi dissident Osama bin Laden, who continues to live in Khandahar and is widely credited with a string of bomb attacks against the US in the Gulf region. That and an abysmal human rights record have played a key role in the reluctance of the international community to recognise Taliban rule in Afghanistan. Mazar-i-Sharif, for example, where the Taliban reportedly massacred as many as 8,000 people in less than a week, continues to be sealed off from both western journalists and aid agencies alike. In addition, the killing of a number of Iranian diplomats and journalists in Mazar has left Teheran firmly backing Massoud.

Besides this there are increasing reports of divisions within the Taliban. Last December saw an internal purging of former Khalkis (officials connected to the communist regime) in the Taliban ranks. Whilst many analysts see this as an indicator of the ascendancy of the hardline faction inside the Taliban - primarily grouped around Taliban major-domo Mullah Omar - the implications are far reaching. A string of defections from Taliban ranks is as good an indicator of anything of growing dissatisfaction amongst some of the rank and file. Growing resentment over heavy casualties have been a factor in encouraging defections - combined with ethnic or tribal differences. "We were being used as cannon fodder," was the comment one commander who defected from Taliban ranks made.

Certainly, Taliban casualties have been massive over the last year and a half. In one incident alone, in 1997, when the Taliban was bloodily repulsed from Mazar-i-Sharif, over 5,000 Taliban footsoldiers were killed - with many being executed in cold blood by Uzbek forces loyal to General Malik. In September 1998, in a bid to take the strategically important Salang region, the Taliban lost a further 2,000-3,000 troops when they walked into a minefield.

For all this, though, there seems to be no shortage of recruits - mainly from Pakistan - flooding to Taliban ranks. Heavy recruiting of Pakistani nationals in the madrasas - religious schools - around the country has kept up a steady supply of manpower, probably comprising at least 10 per cent of the overall Taliban strength. In addition, the return of Afghan refugees has also helped to ensure that manpower is the least of the Taliban's problems. With massive logistical backing from Pakistan, the Taliban still remains the most formidable fighting machine in Afghanistan.

Whether, though, the Taliban will be able to conquer the whole country by force of arms remains to be seen. Whilst the Islamist militia already has 90 per cent of the country theoretically under its control, its authority outside the principal towns is weak stretching to the non-existent in the remoter areas. If the Soviets were unable to conquer the whole country, say many analysts, then the chances of the Taliban - by far less organised - doing the same are remote indeed. All the more so if the internal divisions should come to the fore.

But, whilst the military and political position of Massoud has undoubtedly improved over recent months the situation does not allow for overt optimism. A rise of anti-Taliban sentiment both in the West and in the region. "It may already be too late," said a slightly pessemistic Dr. Abdullah. "We really feel that we are fighting for civilisation here. The Taliban neither recognises nor behaves in a manner conforming to any international norms. Their treatment of women has no roots in Afghan tradition, whatsoever. We really feel that the West has let us down to certain extent. For ten years we fought against an evil empire, and we played a major role in bringing about the collapse of that empire at tremendous cost to our people. Is it really so much to ask the West for some help in return?"