... why Mugabe has waited till now

• 1981 — The Communal Land Act changed the Tribal Trust Lands into Communal Areas, and shifted land authority from traditional rulers to local authorities.

l 1985 — The Land Acquisition Act, though drawn in the spirit of the 1979 Lancaster House “willing seller, willing buyer” clause (which could not be changed for 10 years), the Act gave the government the first right to purchase excess land for redistribution to the landless. The Act, however, had a limited impact largely because the government did not have the money to pay compensation to landowners. In addition, white farmers mounted a vigorous opposition to the Act. Some were plainly unwilling to sell any excess land, others overpriced their land twice or thrice over. Because of the “willing seller, willing buyer” clause, the government was powerless in the face of the farmers’ resistance. As a result, between 1980 and 1990 only 71,000 families out of a target of 162,000 were resettled.

• 1992 — The Land Acquisition Act was enacted to speed up the land reform process by removing the “willing seller, willing buyer” clause. The Act empowered the government to buy land compulsorily for redistribution, and a fair compensation was to be paid for land acquired. Landowners were given the right to go to court if they did not agree to the price set by the acquiring authority. Opposition by landowners increased throughout the period 1992-1997. Britain withdrew aid to the land reform programme, accusing Mugabe of giving the land to his “cronies”. (London now claims to have contributed £44m, but Timothy Stamp, Zimbabwe’s finance minister, who is white, says £17m).

• November 1997 — As part of the implementation of the 1992 Land Acquisition Act, the government published a list of 1,471 farmlands it intended to buy compulsorily for redistribution. The list came out of a nationwide land identification exercise undertaken throughout the year. Landowners were given 30 days (as the 1992 Act demanded) to submit written objections.

• June 1998 — The government published its “policy framework” on the Land Reform and Resettlement Programme Phase II (LRRP II) which envisaged the compulsory purchase over five years of 5 million hectares from the 11.2 million hectares owned by commercial farmers (both black and white), parastatal corporations, churches, NGOs and multi-national companies. Broken down, the 5 million hectares meant that every year (between 1998 and 2003), the government intended to purchase one million hectares for redistribution.

• September 1998 — The government called a donors conference in Harare on land reform (LRRP II); 48 countries and international organisations attended. The objective was to inform and involve the donor community in the programme. The donors unanimously endorsed the land programme, saying it was essential for poverty reduction, political stability and economic growth. They particularly appreciated the political imperative and urgency of the land reform, and agreed that the “inception phase” covering 24 months should start immediately.

• 1999 — The Commercial Farmers Union freely offered for sale to the government 1.5 million hectares for redistribution. But the programme had to move on. Landowners once again dragged their feet. As frustration set in on both sides, the government drafted a new constitution with a clause to compulsorily acquire land for redistribution without paying compensation. The drafting stage of the constitution was largely boycotted by the opposition (supported by the landowners), claiming that Mugabe only wanted a new constitution to entrench himself politically.

• February 2000. The government organised a referendum on the new constitution. If it had been approved, the new constitution would have empowered the government to acquire land compulsorily without compensation. Naturally, the country’s powerful landed gentry (mostly white, who also control the economy) threw its weight and money behind the disparate opposition and human rights groups who formed a united front to fight against the new constitution. Calling themselves the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), the united front won 55% of the votes as against the ruling Zanu-PF’s 45%. There was wild jubilation by the MDC’s local and foreign supporters, prompting “End of Mugabe” headlines in the British media. Two weeks later, the pro-Mugabe War Veterans Association organised people of like mind (not necessarily war veterans as many of them were too young to have fought in the Liberation War) to march on white-owned farmlands, initially with drums, song and dance. They claimed to have “seized” the farmlands.

• Mid-February 2000 — Britain throws its weight behind the white farmers (20,000 of whom have British ancestry and the right to live in Britain). At first, London and its media resorted to bluff and bullying. They tried to use diversionary tactics by focusing on human rights, elections and the current economic difficulties in Zimbabwe. It was all an attempt to sidetrack the main issue of land reform.

• March 2000 — The diversionary tactics having misfired badly, London now upped the ante by trying to organise its European Union and other Western allies to put pressure on Mugabe. The Conservative Party called for Zimbabwe to be suspended from the Commonwealth as the British media loudly condemned Mugabe and called him all sorts of names. Meanwhile the farm “invasions” continued. The Commercial Farmers Union went to court and won an injunction calling on the police to evict the “squatters”. But the police chief refused to move, claiming he didn’t have the manpower to implement the court’s order. He appealed against the ruling and lost. Still the police wouldn’t move.

• Early April — The farm “invasions” turned nasty, first a black policeman was killed, the British media almost ignored it (mentioning it in a sentence here and there); then one white farmer was killed and all hell broke lose in the British media. Mugabe returned from a conference in Cuba and refused to order the “squatters” off white farmlands. The British and South African media increased their attacks on him in the most blatantly one-sided, fact-twisting coverage the world has seen in many a year. Their bias only stiffened Mugabe’s resolve.

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